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Abstract
In this paper, we describe a new framework for health-
care systems where patients are able to control the disclo-
sure of their medical data. In our framework, the patient’s
consent has a pivotal role in granting or removing access
rights to subjects accessing patient’s medical data. De-
pending on the context in which the access is being exe-
cuted, different consent policies can be applied. Context is
expressed in terms of workflows. The execution of a task in
a given workflow carries the necessary information to infer
whether the consent can be implicitly retrieved or should be
explicitly requested from a patient. However, patients are
always able to enforce their own decisions and withdraw
consent if necessary. Additionally, the use of workflows en-
ables us to apply the need-to-know principle. Even when
the patient’s consent is obtained, a subject should access
medical data only if it is required by the actual situation.
For example, if the subject is assigned to the execution of
a medical diagnosis workflow requiring access to the pa-
tient’s medical record. We also provide a complex medi-
cal case study to highlight the design principles behind our
framework. Finally, the implementation of the framework is
outlined.
1 Introduction
Computerisation of healthcare information storage and
processing, while offering new opportunities to improve
and streamline healthcare delivery, also presents new chal-
lenges to individual privacy. Healthcare information refers
to “any information, whether oral or recorded in any form
or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life
insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse;
and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to an individual
[2].” Healthcare information contains sensitive personal
information; i.e. it may include the details of a person’s
history of diseases and treatments, history of drug use, ge-
netic testing, sexual orientation and practices etc. Improper
disclosure of this data can influence decisions about an indi-
vidual’s access to credit, education and employment. There-
fore, it is crucial that healthcare information systems, which
allow electronic storage, transmission, display and analysis
of healthcare information, should offer adequate protections
to address these concerns.
It has been well accepted in modern medical ethics and
law that patient information is confidential and should not
be disclosed without adequate justification. The justifica-
tion for disclosure should normally be consent [1]. How-
ever, most security models for clinical information sys-
tems are merely variations of Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) which make access decisions based on the role of
the user rather than patient consent. There are some excep-
tions, for example the BMA policy model [5, 6] and Cas-
sandra [10, 11]. The BMA policy model is the first secu-
rity model which requires the patient’s consent for access-
ing healthcare information. Cassandra is a trust manage-
ment system designed for securing electronic health records
which captures consents as special roles in the system. Nev-
ertheless, they have some common problems. First, how
to capture patient consent properly. Patient consent can be
explicit, e.g. in written form, but more often is implicit,
e.g. the context in which the access is being executed could
carry enough information for implicitly obtain consent. In
general, when the use and disclosure of patient information
is for the patient’s own healthcare purposes, and provide the
patient or his legal representative has been informed of what
information sharing is necessary for such purposes, implicit
consent is sufficient. But in the BMA model and Cassandra,
the consent must be explicit. This requirement adds unnec-
essary workload to healthcare professionals. Second, how
to ensure that the consent is obtained on a well informed
basis. A valid consent requires that the patient has been
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informed as to what information is intended to be used or
disclosed, and for which purposes. Consent that has been
obtained does not imply information has been given. How-
ever, none of the current models handle this.
In this paper, we address two main problems of current
access control mechanisms. The first problem is the inte-
gration of patient consent with access control. Most access
control models are designed for non-healthcare systems and
do not have the concept of patient consent at all. How-
ever, patient consent occupies a pivotal role in legitimising
the use and disclosure of healthcare information. Patients
have a right to control access to and disclosure of their own
healthcare information by giving, withholding or withdraw-
ing consent. Therefore patient consent should serve as the
ultimate foundation of access control decisions in health-
care systems. The second problem is related to the need-
to-know principle. According to this principle, even when
one has the necessary approvals, i.e. if the patient consents,
access should not be given unless one has a specific need
to know. An access decision should be justified by not only
who is requiring access and what is being accessed, but also
why the information needs to be accessed. Capturing and
enforcing the access is also useful for mitigating exposure
of healthcare systems to insider attacks [4, 5]. For exam-
ple, browsing a patient’s medical record by a doctor should
be allowed when the doctor is diagnosing the patient, but
should not be allowed if the doctor is off-duty. Access con-
trol models such as RBAC cannot capture the access needs
precisely. For example, in RBAC, the permission assign-
ment is decided by “job functions” assigned to the role. The
set of permissions is assigned to the role statically to enable
the subjects playing this role to perform all the job func-
tions. The subject has all the permissions all the time even
when they are not performing certain job functions.
We believe that to better protect patient privacy, access
control should not just be based on rules of who should or
should not access what. Enforcing a correct procedure is
also important. That is why we introduce a workflow based
control framework. The framework is designed for health-
care systems and can enforce consent-based access control
as well as the need-to-know principle and various other con-
straints. In addition, it releases end users (e.g. the medical
professionals) from security related configurations so that
they can concentrate on their medical duties.
In the following section, we discuss the benefits of work-
flows for deriving consent policies. The rest of this paper
is organized as follows. In Section 3, the case study used
through out the paper is introduced. Section 4 provides an
overview of our consent-based framework. Section 5 de-
scribes the workflow procedures that are used for imple-
menting the case study. In Section 6, the enforcement model
of consent policies is outlined. The implementation of the
framework, and the specification and enforcement of con-
sent policies is described in Section 7. Related work is dis-
cussed in Section 8. We conclude with Section 9 proposing
some future research questions.
2 Why Workflow?
One of the significant benefits of using workflow is that
it provides better process control. Users must follow pre-
defined procedures, ensuring that the work is performed in
the planned way and meets business and regulatory require-
ments. Workflows can also provide feedback to carers. For
instance, if an action defined in a medical procedure is not
performed within a certain amount of time then an alarm
could be raised. The use of workflows enables the logging
of the actions being executed by subjects. These logs can be
used for assessing and improving the performance of car-
ers. Moreover, logs should be made available to patients, or
they representatives, in case they want to audit the medical
procedures to which they were subjected and track respon-
sibilities of subjects in case of negative experiences during
their treatment.
Obtaining patient consent can be easily captured as a
mandatory step in a medical workflow before any use or
disclosure of patient healthcare information. By executing
the workflow, the control requirements for patient consent
can be enforced.
A workflow also provides a way of limiting access per-
missions to the context in which an action is being per-
formed enforcing the need-to-know principle. The intuition
behind this is that subjects need to access specific parts of
the patient’s medical record only when they are executing a
specific task in a workflow. Therefore by associating per-
missions with tasks and tracking the execution of tasks, we
can ensure that the subjects can access medical records only
when they have a need.
Another reason why we consider workflow is that many
efforts has been made in developing and experimenting with
automated or semi-automated medical workflow systems
which support evidence-based medical procedures, thera-
pies and hospital administrations [7, 18, 19, 14]. It is likely
that workflow systems will become a core component in fu-
ture healthcare systems [13].
In our work, we assume that governmental organisations
such as the National Health Service in the United King-
dom are responsible for designing and providing to hospi-
tals standard medical procedures. Workflow systems help
with this through secure auditing mechanisms that can track




In this section, we describe a case study based on the
scenario introduced in [9].
Bob Arkwright visits his General Practitioner (GP), Dr
Zimmer, because of heart problems. Dr Zimmer performs
the basic procedure for heart problems and accesses Bob’s
record for annotating Bob’s symptoms and updating his
medical history with his heart conditions. Following, Dr
Zimmer believes that Bob heart problems are related to
a coronary artery disorder. Dr Zimmer decides that Bob
should go to the local hospital to see a specialist.
After Bob is admitted at the hospital, he proceeds to see
Dr Hassan, the cardiologist in the local hospital. Dr Has-
san decides that Bob needs a radial artery catheterisation
(RAC) procedure performed. Bob is taken to the Cardiac
Catheterisation Laboratory for the procedure. The results of
the test are sent to the ancillary department, where Dr Has-
san reviews them electronically together with Bob. Given
the location and severity of the artery blockage, Dr Has-
san recommends Bob to undergo a Coronary Artery By-
pass Surgery to bypass the occluded arteries and create new
routes for blood to flow to the heart muscle. Bob agrees to
have the procedure performed and is admitted to the inpa-
tient facility.
A surgical team is assigned to Bob. The head of the
team, Dr Green, reviews the bypass procedure with Bob
along with the anticipated recovery process and time period.
Afterwards, Dr Green assigns to Bob a recovery procedure
that nurses in the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU) will
follow. The recovery procedure prescribes the necessary
post-operative medications for Bob.
Bob is aware that Sara, his neighbor, works in the lo-
cal hospital as surgical nurse and she is part of his surgical
team. He decides that she should not be allowed to have
access to his medical record. When the team reviews Bob’s
record, Sara is not allowed to access the record and notifies
Dr Green. Because Bob’s procedure is very complicated, to
safeguard Bob’s health Dr Green prefers that all team must
be able to access Bob’s record in case complications would
arise during the surgery. Therefore, he decides to discharge
Sara from the team and finds a valid substitute that has ac-
cess to Bob’s record.
During surgery, abnormal liver parameters are found and
the surgical team needs to access Bob’s record to try to
find some useful information about his liver. Bob’s medi-
cal data related to liver shows that he has a history of alco-
hol abuse. However, because the complete team has access
to his record, they are able to overcome the problems and
conclude the procedure successfully.
When Bob fully recovers from the operation, Dr Hassan
and Dr Green review Bob’s case and medical data and de-
cide that the success of the procedure should be made avail-
Figure 1. Overview of our Consent-based
Framework
able to the research community by publishing the results
in a major medical journal. However, since the publication
of Bob’s case (and medical data) is not directly concerned
with Bob’s health, Dr Hassan and Dr Green should ask an
explicit consent to Bob for accessing his record after the
procedure is concluded. Bob is notified that Dr Hassan and
Dr Green want to access his record for research purposes.
He is contacted by them for further explanations and set up a
meeting at the hospital. During the meeting, Dr Green and
Dr Hassan explain to him that publishing this case could
save the life of other people. Moreover, although his case
would be made public his identity is not disclosed. How-
ever, Dr Green and Dr Hassan ask whether Dr Carter, an
Intern Surgeon, could have access to his record as well. In
fact, both physicians explain that in the coming months they
are going to be very busy and it would be more efficient if
Dr Carter could join them in preparing the article.
Bob agrees on the publication and signs a form that gives
his explicit consent to Dr Hassan and Dr Green, although he
refuses to provide Dr Carter access to his record. Addition-
ally, Bob specifies the duration of his consent: his record
will be accessible to Dr Hassan and Dr Green for a limited
period of one month. During the next month, a paper is
prepared from his case and it is published in a well-known
medical journal.
4 Consent-based Framework
Our workflow based framework consists of the following
components: subject, role, workflow, task, policy, permis-
sion and medical records (see Figure 1).
Each workflow is defined according to a medical proto-
col or administrative process. It consists of multiple tasks.
Each task is associated with a set of policies. The policies
defines the constraints for executing the task. Policies can
be defined by both the hospital and the patient.
A subject is an entity who needs to access a medical
record, e.g. a doctor, a nurse. Each subject has a set of
attributes. The attributes can be used for authorisation deci-
sions.
A role is a named collection of subjects. Unlike in
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Figure 2. An overview of the workflows in-
volved in the case study.
RBAC, which assign permissions directly to roles, in our
framework roles are associated with a set of workflows.
Permissions define the access right the subject has on
the medical records when they are executing this task. The
permissions define what actions can be operated on which
part of a medical record by the subject who is executing the
task. Permissions are derived from the enforcement of the
policies defined on the task.
A medical record is the container of a patient’s health-
care information. Most current electronic medical record
standards define hierarchical substructures which helps or-
ganising the information and make it possible for us to de-
fine fine-grained permissions on these substructures.
5 Implementing the Case Study using Work-
flows
In this section, we discuss the specification of workflows
that implement the case study.
The procedures presented in the scenario are represented
in our framework as workflows. An overview of the sce-
nario in terms of workflows and subjects is given in Fig-
ure 2. In our framework, we distinguish between medical
workflows, that is workflows implementing medical proce-
dures, from non-medical workflows, that are procedures
not directly related to the patient’s health. In Figure 2, med-
ical workflows, such as the GP and Cardiologist diagnosis,
and the surgery, are represented as solid-line blocks. Non-
medical workflows, such as the hospital receptionist, the
lab test and the preparation of the paper, are represented
as dashed-line blocks.
A medical workflow is started by means of a refer oper-
ation. By using a refer operation, one or more subjects are
designated to execute the medical workflow. For instance,
in the scenario shown in Figure 2, The patient refers his GP
to execute a diagnosis workflow. Non-medical workflows
are started as a response to a request operation sent by ei-
ther a subject (i.e. the physicians requiring the starting of
the workflow for the publication of the results) or a task in
a workflow (such as the task in the cardiologist’s workflow
that requests the lab tests).
This distinction allows us to associate with each type of
workflow a different type of consent policy for accessing
the medical record. In particular, the implicit consent with
explicit deny policy is associated with medical workflows.
According to this policy, the patient implicitly consents to
a subject executing a medical workflow to access her/his
medical record. The subject must provide information on
the part of the record that is going to be accessed and the
reasons of the access. The patient can however decide to
explicitly deny access to any subjects at any time. The ra-
tionale behind this policy is that in general a patient accepts
to surrender her privacy for the sake of her health. How-
ever, in certain cases and to the patient’s discretion, the pa-
tient can explicitly deny access to one or more subjects. For
instance, the patient had a negative experience with a par-
ticular physician, or as it is in the case for nurse Sara, the
subject is a patient’s acquaintance to whom the patient does
not wish to provide his personal information.
As for non-medical workflows, they are associated with
an implicit deny with explicit consent policy. This policy
imposes that any subjects executing a non-medical work-
flow are allowed to access a patient’s medical record. The
consent should be asked by the subjects as a task in the
workflow. Once the consent is given by the patient, then
the workflow execution can proceed. Additionally, the pa-
tient can specify temporal and validity constraints to restrict
the access to the medical record for a fixed amount of time.
In the following, we provide more details on how these
consent policies are implemented in our framework. How-
ever, before diving into the details of the consent policies,
we shall give more details on our model for policy enforce-
ment.
6 Policy Enforcement Model
In our model, a permission to access a patient’s medi-
cal record is granted by combining and enforcing two sepa-
rate sets of policies. The first set contains medical policies
that are defined and enforced within the medical institutions
where the patient is being treated (i.e., hospitals, sheltered
houses for elderly people, GP and dentist studios). Poli-
cies in this set can be used for defining constraints related
to time and location (i.e., a doctor can perform a task only
in a specific location during working hours) or to address
separation-of-duty (i.e., a doctor prescribing a medication
should not be also the pharmacist that sells that medication).
The second set of policies contains policies specified by the
patients for protecting the privacy of the information stored
in their medical records.
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When a subject executes a task that requires access to the
medical record of a patient, the relevant policies are chosen
from each set and enforced accordingly. The overall access
control mechanism can be thought of as a two-step process
and is represented in Figure 3. In step (1), the Policy En-
forcement Point (PEP) enforces authorisation policies de-
fined in the subject’s institution (in this case a hospital). If
authorisation is granted then the access is evaluated against
the set of policies defined by the patient that are enforced
by the PEP in step (2). If permission is also granted here,
then in step (3) it is possible to get access to the actual data
in the medical record.
In this paper we are focusing on the specification and
enforcement of patient privacy policies. Therefore in the
following discussion, we provide more details on the second
step of the access control mechanism.
Figure 3. Steps executed for granting a per-
mission.
7 Framework Implementation
The implementation of our framework is realised by in-
tegrating two main systems that are described in the follow-
ing.
7.1 YAWL Workflow System
We use the YAWL system for the specification and en-
actment of workflows [12]. YAWL provides a very power-
ful workflow language together with a workflow execution
engine, and an editor for creating workflow specifications.
YAWL can be customised to export to external components
certain events that occur in the life-cycle of workflow in-
stances. On receiving a task-enabled event, a component
may decide to ‘check-out’ the task from the engine. On
doing so, the engine marks the task as executing and effec-
tively passes operational control for the task to the compo-
nent. When the component has finished executing the task,
it will check it back in to the engine, at which point the en-
gine will mark the task as completed, and proceed with the
workflow execution.
It should be realised that our framework is independent
of the specific workflow language/engine used as long as
the workflow system provides means for interacting with
our framework.
7.2 Ponder Access Control
The other component in our framework is the policy-
based access control module based on the Ponder pol-
icy language and interpreter developed at Imperial College
London [3]. The language supports the specification of poli-
cies for governing the choices in the behaviour of a sys-
tem [22]. Ponder supports the specification of authorisa-
tion policies and event-condition-action (ECA) policies .
The policy interpreter organises the entities and resources
on which policies operate in hierarchical domains of man-
aged objects. A managed object has a management inter-
face that the object has to implement in order to be man-
aged by the interpreter. Domains allow the classification
and grouping of managed objects in a hierarchy. Further-
more, domain paths can be used to address managed objects
in policy specifications. Domains can be used to group re-
sources (e.g., data repositories, printers, X-ray machines,
etc.), devices (e.g., sensors), and people (i.e., nurses, doc-
tors, GPs, etc).
Figure 4. Representation of the case study
using Ponder domain structure.
Figure 4 shows how Ponder’s domain structure may be
used for organising the entities and medical data of the case
study. In particular, the domain structure represents an hy-
pothetical hospital where Bob Arkwright is being visited
by a cardiologist. Hospital personnel are represented by
means of Subject Managed Objects (SMO) that could be
assigned to the respective domain according to the subject’s
role. An SMO can be thought of as an electronic credential
that identifies a specific individual working in the hospi-
tal. The Electronic Health Record (EHR) of a patient, that
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is the digital representation of a patient medical record, is
also represented as a domain structure. The leaves in this
domain structure are Record Managed Objects (RMO).
RMOs represent specific instances of medical documents,
such as the record of allergies, the list of current and past
medications, an MRI picture, and so on. It should be noted
that, although Figure 4 shows Bob’s EHR within the struc-
ture of the hospital that Bob is visiting, the actual storage
of the EHR itself could be done in a remote location 1.
Domains in Ponder transparently supports external links to
point to domains and managed objects contained in domain
structures residing in remote location.
The EHR represents the patient’s private view of her
digitalised medical information (shown as a square around
Bob’s EHR in Figure 4). As such, in our framework pa-
tients are enabled to specify access control policies that
govern the access to such resources. In Ponder, authori-
sation policies are used for controlling the rights that enti-
ties have on the resources managed in a domain structure.
In our case, entities are medical personnel and resources
are the patient’s medical data, represented as SMOs and
RMOs, respectively. Authorisation policies are defined on
(subject,target,action)-triples, where the subject is an SMO
that executes an action on the target RMO. The language
also supports negative authorisation policies, that when ap-
plied negate the execution of the defined action. To be able
to specify authorisation policies, patients need to refer to
the subjects executing the accesses. For this reason, the do-
main Carers in the patient’s EHR is used for containing
references to SMOs, as shown in Figure 4. This domain
contains a collection of references to SMOs of medical per-
sonnel known to the patient. For instance, if we consider
our case study, when Bob goes to his GP, Dr Zimmer, the
Carers domain would contain just the reference to his GP’s
SMO. When Bob is admitted in the hospital, the reception-
ist uses a workflow to refer Bob to Dr Hassan, resulting in
a reference to Dr Hassan’s SMO to be added to Bob’s Carer
domain (shown as a dotted line in Figure 4). The reference
is added in terms of the context in which the refer opera-
tion is executed. Dr Hassan may have several roles within
the hospital and other institutions. This would result in his
SMO being contained in different domains. However, the
context in which the refer operation is executed defines that
a cardiologist within the hospital is required. Therefore, the
path that is added to the Carers domain provides a reference
to Dr Hassan’s SMO as a cardiologist.
Now Bob knows who is his cardiologist and may define
authorisation policies specifically for Dr Hassan. Actually,
this domain represents an important part of the medical his-
1The EHR structure can also be a representation of distributed re-
sources. For instance, RMOs could be stored within the organisations that
created them, i.e. the X-ray images in Bob’s EHR could be stored in an-
other hospital where Bob attended when he broke is leg.
Figure 5. The fine-grained access model sup-
ported in Ponder.
tory of the patient because it provides an overview of the
medical personnel that have provided care to a patient.
An important feature of the authorisation model in Pon-
der is the fine-grained access control mechanism. Authori-
sation policies can be independently specified for control-
ling the subject-side and the target-side of an action. A full
description of the model can be found in [20]. Here, for
brevity reasons, we just recall the details of the model that
are relevant for our discussion.
As shown in Figure 5, the access control mechanism pro-
vides 4 different PEPes to enforce policies. Policies can be
specific for the subject and the target side of a request. The
policies enforced at PEP 1 control the subject when it sends
out a request. We name such policies Subject authorisa-
tion (SA) policies. The PEP 2 is used for enforcing autho-
risation policies for control on the target side. We name
these policies Target authorisation (TA) policies. The poli-
cies enforced at PEP 4 and PEP 3 are the dual of SA and TA
policies. These policies, called respectively Subject-return
authorisation (SRA) and Target-return authorisation (TRA),
are used for controlling the return part of an action. SRA
policies can be used for protecting the integrity of a sub-
ject (i.e. checking that the reply does not contain malicious
data). TRA policies can be used for filtering the data that is
returned to a subject.
Using SA and TA policies (enforced at PEP 1 and PEP
2), it becomes possible to employ this mechanism for im-
plementing the model described in section 6. In particular,
hospital policies are specified and enforced as SA policies.
On the other hand, patients can use TA policies for control-
ling the access to the private view of their medical data. A
patient uses the references contained in the Carers domain
for specifying which SMO a TA policy is to be applied.
In case of authorisation conflicts, that could happen
when authorisation policies of different signs apply to the
same triple, the interpreter is also able to autonomously re-
solve those conflicts. For more details on the rules that are
applied for resolving conflicts, we refer the interested reader
to [20]
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Ponder ECA policies are used to dynamically adapt the
system to changes of either context or behaviour of appli-
cations. Events are trigged by such changes and are propa-
gated using an event bus. ECA polices capture events and
execute actions for adapting the system. For example, ECA
policies can change the domain structure adding/removing
domains and managed objects, can invoke action on man-
aged objects, can enable/disable other policies and can trig-
ger other ECA policies by sending more events.
The following sections, we discuss how patient consent
policies are enforced in our framework.
7.3 Consent Meta Policies
In this section, we take a closer look at the enforcement
of patient consent policies. In our framework, the contex-
tual information obtained by the workflow execution to-
gether with the enforcement of TA and ECA policies are
used to derive what we call consent meta policies. In the
following, we provide more details on two types of consent
meta policies that are suitable for medical environments.
7.3.1 Implicit Consent with Explicit Deny Policy
(ICED)
The ICED policy is associated with the execution of medi-
cal workflows. The main idea behind this policy is that a pa-
tient implicitly allows a subject executing a workflow con-
cerning her health to access the EHR. However, the patient
can explicitly deny access to one or more subjects involved
in the current or any future workflows.
Implicitly allowing subjects executing a medical work-
flow to access an EHR means that the patient is not required
to explicitly specify permissions for the subjects. The sys-
tem can derive the permissions from the context in which
the access is being executed and automatically generate the
required permissions. In this way, the need-to-know prin-
ciple is enforced without giving unnecessary burdens to the
patients. However, a subject executing a medical workflow
should provide information to a patient on each access to
the EHR. This means that before the access is performed the
subject should explain to the patient which part of the EHR
needs to be accessed and the motivations that justify such
an access. If the patient thinks that the given motivations
are not exhaustive or that more information than necessary
is being accessed, the consent can be withdrawn.
In our framework, the enforcement of the ICED policy is
achieved using the following two mechanisms.
In order to inform a patient that an access is going to
be executed, the task that represents the access is divided
into two sub-tasks. Figure 6 shows the splitting of a “Read
Allergy History” task in two sub-tasks: “Inform Patient”
and “Read Allergy RMO”. The first sub-task requires the
Figure 6. Division in sub-tasks of a task that
performs an access to the EHR.
subject to inform the patient that an access to the allergy
record is going to be executed. If the patient consents then
the second sub-task is executed, that is the actual access to
the record. However, if the patient denies the access, then
alternative tasks need to be executed. For instance, in the
case of Figure 6 the subject can require a lab test to get the
information that is required to carry on the workflow exe-
cution. It might be the case that, even if the patient gives
the consent, pre-existing negative policies could deny the
access. This situation can be captured as an alternative ex-
ecution of the workflow. In the case shown in Figure 6, if
access is denied, then a lab test is requested. If no alterna-
tive solutions are available, then the subject executing the
workflow can be notified by the workflow engine to manu-
ally take some actions. Related research investigating spec-
ification and handling of exceptional situations in medical
workflows be found in Han et al. [16].
The automatic provision of access rights is performed
by means of Ponder ECA policies. Figure 7 provides an
overview of the generation of such permissions. The exam-
ple shown is that of Dr Hassan that wants to read the allergy
history of Bob. After Dr Hassan obtains Bob’s consent to
proceed, the “Read Allergy RMO” sub-task is declared ex-
ecuting by the YAWL workflow engine and an event with
this information is sent. The event also carries context-
dependent data, such as: the specific instance of the task
that is activated, that the task is part of a medical workflow,
the subject that is executing it, the target and action that is
performed, the location and time. This event triggers an
ECA policy, that using the data carried by the event, gener-
ates and activates a positive TA policy. This policy, called
+TA1, is shown in Figure 7 as an arrow connecting Dr Has-
san’s SMO to the AllergyRMO. When Dr Hassan, via his
SMO, performs the action of reading the AllergyRMO, the
access control mechanism captures such an action and en-
forces authorisation policies at PEP1 and PEP2. The SA
policies enforced at PEP1 are specified by the hospital. We
assume that Dr Hassan complies with the hospital policies
and that from the point of view of the hospital the action is
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Figure 7. Representation of the TA policy
generated by an ECA policy.
allowed. Another enforcement of authorisation policies is
done at PEP2. Here, the mechanism searched for TA poli-
cies. Because policy +TA1 is already in place the action can
be authorised. (Although, it could be the case that there are
conflicts with other policies previously specified by Bob;
we discuss this case later in this section). Another impor-
tant step that is not shown in Figure 7 is that of automati-
cally disabling the authorisation policy. After this sub-task
is concluded, the YAWL engine sends an event that triggers
another ECA policy. This ECA policy will take care of dis-
abling policy +TA1. This use of ECA policies guarantees
that the permission for accessing the EHR is available only
for the execution of the specific task.
Our framework enables a patient to define negative au-
thorisation policies that deny subjects access to the EHR.
Once the SMO reference becomes available into the Carer
domain in the EHR, the patient can define a negative TA
policy for that specific SMO. When the system generates
the positive TA using the mechanism describe above, this
positive TA will be in conflict with the negative TA created
by the patient. In this case, the conflict resolution mecha-
nism will give priority to the patient’s negative TA policy.
This means that the access is denied and an alternative ac-
tion must be taken. For instance, in our case study, the sur-
geon is notifies that a nurse (Sara) is not allowed to access
Bob’s EHR when the surgery team is executing the debrief-
ing task in the Artery Bypass Surgery workflow. Therefore,
before executing the actual surgery, the surgeon decides to
remove the nurse from the team.
7.3.2 Implicit Deny with Explicit Consent Policy
(IDEC)
The IDEC policy is used for non-medical workflows. This
type of policy implies that no access to the patient EHR
is given to subjects executing non-medical workflows. If
a SMO requires access to the EHR during a non-medical
workflow the consent must be explicitly asked to the patient.
It is up to the patient to decide whether or not to give the
required consent.
The patient can decide to give the consent by specifying
a positive TA policy. The policy must be as restrictive and
specific as possible. The subject should be the specific SMO
of the subject and the target the necessary record. Moreover,
the action can only be a “read” because a subject executing
a non-medical workflow must not be allowed to change any
part of an EHR. The policy should be associated with an
expiring time (and/or a number of access for which is valid)
and could restrict the time and location where the consent is
granted.
8 Related Work
The BMA policy model was developed in late 1990s in
response to the National Health Service (NHS) project of
building a nationwide medical database. The access priv-
ileges for each medical record are defined in the form of
access control lists (ACLs) and managed by a responsible
clinician who is the only one can change the ACLs. The
main goal of the BMA model is to enforce the principle
of patient consent, and to prevent too many people getting
access to too large databases of identifiable records. A pro-
totype implementation has been built in a General Practice
environment [17]. Apart from the weakness we discussed
in the introduction, other criticisms include the ACLs are
not flexible and expressive enough, and the model is more
clinician-centered rather than patient-centered.
Cassandra is a role-based trust management language
and system for expressing authorisation policy. Cassandra
supports credential-based authorisation between adminis-
trative domains, and rules can refer to remote policies for
credential retrieval and trust negotiation. The main focus
of Cassandra are healthcare systems. Cassandra has been
used to develop a policy for the UK national electronic
health record (EHR) system, based on the requirements of
the NHS’ National Programme for Information Technology
(NPfIT). The notion of consent is captures in Cassandra as
a special role. The consent is given to a subject, that is as-
signed to a special role, only if the subject requests the con-
sent from the patient. This requirement adds extra workload
for the healthcare professionals. As we shown in this paper,
in most situations the consent can be implicitly derived from
the context.
Also relevant to our discussion is the RBAC model pro-
posed in [15, 21]. RBAC is motivated by the observa-
tion that in the real-world most access control decisions are
based on the subject’s job functions in an organisation. This
observation is valid for organisations that own the data that
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is being accessed. For healthcare organizations however,
the medical data that is being accessed is “owned” by pa-
tients. Ideally, medical data should only be disclosed when
consent is obtained from patients. But the notion of con-
sent is not captured by the original RBAC model. Thereby,
extensions to this model are required for its applicability in
healthcare systems (such as Cassandra).
The idea of using the workflow concept for deriving ac-
cess rights was first conceived by Atluri and Huang in [8],
where they introduce the Workflow Authorisation Model
(WAM). In WAM, authorisation constraints for data and re-
sources are synchronised with the execution of workflows.
Our framework described here is a refinement of the WAM
model where the patient consent plays a crucial role in the
access control decisions.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a framework for enforcing
consent policies for healthcare systems based on workflows.
In our framework, patients’ consent has a central role for
assigning permissions to subjects that access patients’ med-
ical data. The context that is derived from the workflow
execution is used for enforcing consent policies. Patients
can fine tune those policies and effectively control the sub-
jects to which consent is given or withdrawn. Additionally,
the use of workflows allows us to enforce the need-to-know
principle whereby a subject can access the patient’s medical
data only if there is a specific need. In our framework, this
need is associated with the execution of specific workflows.
As part of our future work, we intend to carry out per-
formance measurements of our prototype. Another area
that we want to explore is that of using our framework for
expressing meta policies to capture conflict-of-interest and
separation-of-duties policies and to apply the framework to
in financial applications.
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